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North Korea 76, North Koreans 49, United States 33, South Korea 27, Us 26, U.s. 16, China 14, Evans 12, Jonathan 10, Pyongyang 10, Steve 8, Dr. Hecker 5, Iran 5, Perry 5, Korea 4, South Koreans 4, Epa 3, Mr. Kim 3, Nelson 3, U.n. 3,
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  CSPAN    Today in Washington    News/Business. News.  

    April 16, 2013
    6:00 - 9:00am EDT  

>> i had a group of shopping send people in yesterday. that was one of their three, four top issues, the epa issued they felt was wrongly decided. it's across the board. so your nomination is important. i'm going to be submitting to use some 30 some odd questions for the record.
they deal with a lot of important issues, how you think and how you will administer this agency. i expect you to give us a candid reply. will you do that? >> i absolutely will, and thank you for spending more than an hour with me yesterday. i know it was an incredibly busy day. >> a valuable exchange. we talked about a number of things, but i would like you to tell me, and tell this committee and the american people that you understand the seriousness of the regulatory responsibilities that you have, and that you will say no to anyone in this administration, political interest or the president himself if he is asked a shortcut or conduct regulatory procedures and processes that you believe are not consistent with highest standards of the epa administrator. >> i will abide by the highest standard that the law and the
science asks me to do, and we'll be having good conversations to make sure that you hold me to that. >> that's a good. i mentioned the brick company making those items that make american homes better and better. in 2005, henry brick spent 1.5 million on dry line that remove pollutants. i'm told that will remove 90% of the pollutants. other brick company spent 100 million so far. but then an event occurred. sierra club filed a lawsuit, as many environmental groups do, challenging the epa rule. and a 2007 after the initiate come in to comply with epa's rules, according -- a court invalidated that. the epa, their office on your leadership entered a settlement agreement with sierra club
establishing a much more ambitious schedule for finalizing new and more stringent brick macworld. so onto the proposed consent, epa must propose a new rule of august of this year and finalize it by july of 2014, is that correct? >> that is the current settlement schedule i believe, but i can get back to you. my memory may not be exact on that. >> so this could be a much more costly rule. it could add up to $8 million to henry brick, they say. open a. i will submit for the record letters to me series of brick companies in my state that expressed real concern about that. >> the one thing i can add is i do know that this particular sector has a number of small businesses. in fact, i think most are small
businesses, and we're going to have to be incredibly sensitive to the impact of any proposed rule. nevermind the final come and go to the appropriate process to make sure we understand the implications on small business. >> you don't want to just consolidate every small business to no longer compete and then it's clear to steal for the mega business. ms. mccarthy, in november president obama stated, quote, the temperature around the globe is increasing faster than was predicted even 10 years ago, closed quote. i thought that was curious because i've seen some data that indicated not, that was not true. in fact, it has been fairly flat. and certainly, so, i wrote administrator jackson and astor
simply this, to provide the data according to the present assertion on with quote a chart of the actual global average temperature increases since 1979 versus the latest ipcc predictions, closed quote. and you responded to that, but they didn't respond to my question. he basically said in february of this year quote, there are multiple lines of evidence that clearly demonstrate that average global temperatures are rising, closed quote. so you didn't provide any specific data relating to the question i asked -- >> would you like me to take another shot at that? >> if i could say, i'm adding two minutes to your time so you will get seven. if senator bozeman wants 70 will get that as well. >> thank you, madam chair. >> i am more than happy to take a look at that and get back to
your. >> very good. i notice on march 30, a publication that supports climate change stated quote over the past 15 years, air temperatures at the earth's surface have been flat while greenhouse gas emissions have continued to soar. do you dispute that? >> actually i don't know the study, but i also want to make sure that you don't look at me as a climate scientist. i do rely on those that are and i'm more than happy to work with them in order to take a look at the study and get back to you if it would be of interest. >> all i'm saying, it makes sense to me, and always had some commonsensical idea, that a blanket effect of co2 and other greenhouse gases might increase the temperature, and we have seen some temperature increase over the year, over the century may become but hasn't been
following the model much below the recent model. we have a quick chart this is -- red line represents with ipcc average of from and the other is not reaching that level. i hope the president will be accurate in his statement. >> thank you. senator bozeman. you get seven, and then senator vitter gets five and i get five, and then you are done. okay, go ahead. >> thank you for being with us, ms. mccarthy comes along, and we do appreciate that. don't feel bad. in regard to instant messaging to the investment of my three daughters, i don't have a clue either as to do that. let me just ask you a few things that think the really important. according to epa, water
infrastructure shortfall of over $500 billion over the next two decades, which amounts to about $25 billion annually. amazingly this doesn't even take into account the hundreds of billions of compliance costs, yeah, and fatalities are facing due to the epa's pension sometimes are certainly thomas aggressive? in our that have very little discretion income. the communities are in trouble themselves. the increased costs disproportionately low-income families in economically distressed communities. in response to this a growing number of cities, groups like the u.s. conference of mayors, the national league of cities, national association of clean water agencies have been seeking
increase relief to prioritize is and to develop longer compliance schedules to meet the increase and complex requirements. i guess what i was asked if, so for the epa has been working to partner in these efforts, to some extent. i guess my questions are come to support is included in printed from the is to maximize, meeting the customers requirements of the clean water act? >> i think you will find your favorite big friend in, i were little. i understand the stress they are under and the need for us to be flex will as well as. >> vent along with that you do you have plans to make perhaps integrated plan even a more useful tool, utilities? >> if there is a way in which we can do that, i think that's the
smartest thing available to us spent the other thing that is come up is what we would like to do through congressional action or whatever is to extend longer clean water act permits to give some -- one of the things we're going on right now that really is impacting the economy in so many ways is, you just don't know what the future holds. and so as, to you processing so we can have, you know, a longer period that the communities can plan in? >> i wish i could tell you i knew enough about that answer that for me the unconfirmed on him as you choose proposed rule a really complex and portable
and -- that to me as a bit on the short side. so i guess again, my question is would you be willing to look at a longer period of time to have somebody actually, i'm suggesting 90-100 days, but it is based on anything. six is too long. 60 days just to read the stuff is probably adequate, you know? on stuff. would you be willing to i more than happy to look at that issue. >> thank you very much. the other thing is i just, i'm an optometrist by training and so i am familiar with the
scientific world. the idea that we have taxpayer financed databases that we can use to conduct cost-benefit analysis by epa or really any other agency or really any other entity that is making these really, you know, the difficult decisions that have tremendous impact, i don't understand why all of that information isn't being made publicly. i was at the white house yesterday, in the evening and visited with the president with a group. i walked through the security without any problems. they don't look at me because i'm a united states senator, but the idea that i can't get the information, you know, that i need to see the studies that you are doing. and again, i've got trust in the agency but with oversight of the agency. i just don't understand that. >> senator, the information that we have not been able to gather
and share is information that is confidential. it relates to medical records and information that can trace back to specific people. and we are required to protect that as a scientist. having said that, if there's anything that we can do to build a more trust these him and on him and him and him and the redacted as far as coming in, the people in that sort of thing. again, you don't have a bunch of information that you shouldn't have dumped out that you know what you shouldn't have dumped out with peoples names and all this kind of stuff. again, we talk about transparency in business. i don't know that there's, in any other area of research, those things are taken care of word you redact, you do this and
that, names, things like that. but the basic science, there's just no excuse. >> i am more than happy to work with you. if you think there are things we're not doing, i know that the administration is fully committed to transparency and i am personally. so we should sit down, and/or something were doing cannot be debated that you think should be available to you, we will take those steps. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. senator vitter. >> thank you, madam chair. and just to follow up on my colleagues questions, because as you know that was one of our central points of these five. we have been very specific about him and. and i think him and him him him him him. that is absolutely possible that has been asked for four years
with regard to the keys did under the decision. it has not been provided. so i just remake that request. i think we've been extremely specific. on another point there's been a lot of discussion about cost-benefit analysis. all in an inadequate way him and him and -- you have been -- as section and analysis ever been done and it has been done by agency, yes. not in those particular rules. >> on those rules from what i've talked about the put on, biggest
him and him and we want a analysis been done on the? >> i should be clear, the whole economy analysis with him in on a larger and him and him to. with him and -- to the extent that we can define the economic consequences of those rules using the best modeling available, we believe we did that. but if-and him that you think into and -- by more than willing to look at that. >> from the analysis was not done in that case. i think that is required and
appropriate. analysis that was done him and did it take account of negative impacts of increased energy costs economy was? >> it looked at energy, expected energy cost. it looked at expected job growth or loss. >> so it specifically quantified expected energy cost increases and measured those impacts? >> no. are probably not well-positioned to answer these questions but i am more than happy to do that following the meeting and we can walk through those. >> this is a huge body of your work this is a pretty fundamental question. we have these big rigs. are we-andy kaufman effective if my understanding is that was not done on an economy wide face it. it seems to me it is a glaring omission. let me move on to another the concern of ours which is number five in our list.
which is pursue and settle practice. we all have been concerned that in some cases epa and him and. him the group and even are the only two parties in the lawsuit and him up with a settlement and the truly impacted parties never have a seat at the table. never get input, never say. him ask you to change that practice. and so far you haven't agreed to the request. him him him did group like to stay for instance, shouldn't they have a seat at him in any proposed him that? >> what i can speak to is how we practice it under the clean air act. the cleaner act actually does require public comment on him and does for him and.
him and him and for him him him him him him him. >> him and those agreement out for public comment. >> have you ever changed agreements based on comments? >> i don't know the full history of the agency's him him in bed by now, we are supposed him and the statute speak with him we close with state-owned reasonable pace issues to the extent we can. >> have you responded to the foia request? >> i'm not sure what specific
you are talking unconservative back to you and find out. >> i would for the record, thank you. >> thank you. >> does the epa use peer-reviewed science when crafting clean air rules? does the agency analyze the impacts of both including on affected industries using widely accepted a cannot him and how we do our from yes does the office of management and budget him agency in him an official guidelines? spin him him and him and him and him and him and him and i guess they are in it and want a place in the record this letter that was waved around by one of our
center for him him and him and won't years, here it is. guess what. him tha and went into the record with him and him and give it is under steven johnson there was destruction of hundreds upon hundreds of e-mails. so with him and can into what the heck happened through these e-mails. and as they went through the they were destroyed automatically and him and him and him him him him him him him that's the genesis of this whole thing for him is him him and him and we ar him we are ready becam and pulled him and him and him
and him and him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him him and him and
>> stands adjourned [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] him. >> monday items president spoke at the national press club about the creation of the new group to address regional issues to him and him fired him and let him stand and work.
>> him to has him and photograph of president obama and governor christie the part of you within that climate change is real quick. >> a look at the picture of president obama and governor christie. three days before election day was an absolute and talk to the people that had their homes
destroyed or the communities destroyed. due to the extreme weather events. look at the reports on china on january and february. one example just to give you a visual, the melting of the arctic sea ice in my part of the world, a consequence that 180,000 froze to death out in the field in china. so whether we call the climate change or not, that political concept which is a negative connotation the i think the and the consequences of the ice melting is extreme weathers in the united states and china this is the overwhelming scientific evidence to conclude, to prove not just from the chinese but also from your universities and
research institutes in the united states. so we can have all parents of the about climate a scientifically proven relationship. the melting of the arctic sea ice has come we have consequences within a few months, not 10 or 20 years in the future but within a few months. and in other parts of the world. and, therefore, that should be in my opinion a sufficient reason to have a serious debate. i don't care whether we call a climate change or the melting of the arctic sea ice or extreme weather problem. it is a reality which we have to deal with it on reality that many of the insurance companies that are no longer willing to take insurance policies for private homes in florida,
serious. the intention and stopped being willing to ensure your home. i think that is from the business world sufficient indication that this issue of the melting of the ice and extreme weather is a fundamental business, business reality. >> the new commander of us-led international forces in afghanistan testified today before the senate armed services committee. see live starting at 9:30 a.m. eastern on our companion network c-span3. >> over the last certainly over the last four years am a little worried about this administration it that i think it'is part of a long-term trendf the.
him to protect him and his illiberalism come that will go to definition of that's where him. but as a christian i am worried when the state, hhs agency wants to mandate that catholic institutions, i'm catholic, have to pay for him abortions in the insurance programs. and i'm worried when the supreme court starts taking up things like gay marriage. i'm worried about the things i see at the universities so i sent him a state imposing a particular kind of agenda from him and and this is bigger than politics. it's bigger than republican and democrat. it's a particular worldview and that is him you i am investigating in him in a on to
work sunday night at my portable tv this weekend him and institution the in the coverage of u.s. policy recommendations, nonproliferation efforts, "usa today" him and him is about 90 minutes. ..
>> but there are a lot of questions surrounding this, and both what's going on and what the implications are, whether there's a way out of this, and i have six questions that i am going to pose to my colleagues in different permutations and combinations, and we will march through these as expeditiously as we can to leave time for your questions. the first question is, is this crisis different from previous ones? if it's, in what ways? and what is the real danger of war? so, evans, would you take a stab at the first answer? >> sure. sure, richard, thank you very much, and thank everybody for being here today. i think in a number of respects as you look at the crisis as it
has unfolded, it's easy -- especially for cynical, old korea hands like me -- to say there they go again, déjà vu all over again. and to some extent, there is a baseline level of similarity to previous crises that we've been through before. there's a baseline level of threat and rhetoric that one always hears from north korea, and so it's easy to dismiss that. but this crisis, i think, is somewhat different than past. the threats have been much more specific than in the past, the level and intensity of the rhetoric has been much more bombastic and over the top than in the past, and perhaps the biggest difference is in terms of north korean capabilities. ten or fifteen years ago we were not dealing with a north korea that had conducted a series of nuclear weapons tests. several years ago we were not dealing with a north korea that had successfully launched a
long-range rocket that many of us feel is an early stage in the development of an icbm capability. and many years ago we were not dealing with a north korea that was making specific threats to attack targets with nuclear weapons, which is what they're doing now. now, it's one thing to make these threats, it's another thing to have of the capability to carry hem out -- them out, and i don't want to overreact to these threats or to suggest that north korea does have the ability to carry out some of the more outrageous of the provocative they wants that it has made -- threats that it has made. but we ought to be concerned particularly about the possibility of miscalculation, misperception on their part. the worst mistake any country can ever make is believing its own propaganda, and there may be some people in their system who do. and that is, obviously, a concern. and, also, another reason that this crisis is different than the past is because we've got a new person in charge in
pyongyang. over the years we developed a sense of how far kim ill song was prepared to push things op the korean peninsula, and we knew pretty much how to deal with him. and then his successor, kim jung-il, we had a sense of how to deal with him based on a number of years of experience, most of it bad. but we had a sense of the limits of this leader. we have a new leader now, and we don't know his limits. we don't know to what extent he understands what he is up against both in terms of u.s. and south korean military capabilities. so are we on the verge of war? i suspect not. we haven't seen any of the outrageous rhetoric we've seen from pyongyang matched with major force movements, artillery is not moving up to the front, tanks and armored units are not moving around, etc. but the possibility of a mistake or a miscalculation is there, and whenever that possibility exists, you need to prepare for a whole range of possible
outcomes, and that's why i think the way the u.s. administration and the rok have handled this so far has been pretty good. >> good, thank you very much. jonathan, you have another or different take on this? >> well, i wouldn't quarrel, in essence, with what evans has layed out. certainly, there's a lot, a lot to argue for sort of viewing this as something that is somewhat different from what we've seen before. i do, however, find a certain irony that there seems almost in some quarters a wistful nostalgia for kim jung-il, that paragon of rationally, what have you. [laughter] and not to mention that, for grandpa himself going back a little farther. so much of what we see here has, dare i say, a very, very contrived quality. this is a manufactured crisis, but it is a predominantly, i believe, for domestic purposes in north korea. but it's additionally a calculation that suggests to me
that young mr. kim, or as i fondly like to call him, 3.0, that he sees this as the basis for a certain, creating a certain legitimacy in the eyes of his own people and, curiously, he may think in the eyes of the outside world. because that frustration that north korea feels that no one, no major power, no power at all so far as i can see perhaps with the exception of iran, would be prepared to, in effect, legitimate these kinds of nuclear weapons capabilities and give north korea what it seeks, which is in some sense to enable it to punch above its weight. that its dysfunction continues economically and in other respects what we see and this is perhaps what is most disheartening, that a young, untested leader has not only returned and reverted to form --
that is to say adopting fully the strategy that his father pursued -- but he's, he's ratcheted this up at least in a propaganda way to even higher levels. that said, anyone who reads north korean propaganda, and you know i need a hobby since i clearly spend a lot of time reading north korean propaganda, will have to note the conditional element that is there in every statement the north koreans make. something that says, you know, if american imperialists and their running dogs in south korea dare take one step, dare attack us, then we will unleash this unimaginable attack against them, including nuclear weapons, putting aside to one point whether or not there is a capability, in fact, to do what they threaten to do. but that, i think, bespeaks of the sense of frustration that north korea often encounters. that does add to the element of
risk here, i wouldn't dispute what evans says. but that's why i think we need to take these statements seriously, prepare carefully, but certainly not overreact which in a way would be playing to north korea's preferred responses. >> mike, do you have anything to add? >> just very briefly, richard, and thanks for the opportunity. it's an honor to be up here with such distinguished north korea experts and the whole panel, and my comment is much more general and not specialized nearly as much. but i still want to just raise a question based on one thing jonathan said about what the main purpose is behind all these provocations. and, jonathan, you mentioned that your interpretation is that it's largely for domestic purposes. i have no doubt there is that element. but i also wonder if north korea just wants to make this particular crisis so darn unpleasant for everybody that we're actually scared from applying further sanctions if there is an additional nuclear test. and part of why i raise this
hypothesis or this question is because i got out my copy of the latest north korea bible this weekend -- [laughter] this is jonathan's own book, "no exit," which anybody here who wants a wonderful 200-page description of what's behind north korea's nuclear program really should read it. and as you argue persuasively, the nuclear program has become something pretty important to the regime. whether or not there's any hope of getting rid of it as we still aspire to is another question, but you make it pretty clear it's a powerful and strong motivator. to the extent that's true, they might want to do another nuclear test. their scientists might be saying we can't quite vouch for a miniaturized warhead on a missile yet, and, therefore, they may want to spook beijing and other capitals so much that if and when they do that additional nuclear test, nobody dares apply more sanctions. so it's just another theory i wanted to get into the mix. i can't prove it, it's just based on inference and on my reading of their history and their commitment to the nuclear
program and what they might be thinking of as their next steps. >> could i just interject one other point here? it does seem one of the time-honored elements in the north korean playbook is that once a decision is made to take a particular step, particularly a developmental step in terms of nuclear weapons or missile development, you look for a rationale that can then justify what you have already decided to do. and that's very, very relevant to what you've just described, so we'll wait and see. >> okay. let's come back to that next question, but it seems to me that one of the ways in which this situation is different from past ones is the consequences that will flow from being that the names sometimes -- something that the north koreans sometimes do, and that is a limited strike against a target in south korea. up until november 2010, south korea was willing to take the
punch and respond in a tempered and somewhat symbolic way. that is no longer south korea's policy, and there was a decision made and has been developed over the last two years to respond more robustly, to employ, essentially, deterrence by punishment. and south korea's worked very closely with the united states in programming what the response will be. the question that none of us can answer is what does north korea do once south korea retaliates? does anybody want to comment on that? >> let me take a first cut at that. in the aftermath of the november 2010 north korean artillery attack on the island, that was, by the way, the first time north korean artillery shells had fallen on south korea since the
end of the korean war, so that was a significant and very disturbing development. there was a limited south korean retaliation at that point, but in the aftermath the previous rok president made it very clear that his government would respond kinetically is the term of art to future north korean attacks. and now under south korea's new president, they've made it even clearer that there will be a clear and immediate and proportional response to any north korean attack on south korean soil or on south korean warships and aircraft. and that is an important message that north korea needs to understand. i think it's an open question based on the fact that the screaps over the decades -- south koreans over the decades have not responded to the north. does, is that message -- has that message fully been taken onboard by pyongyang?
do they understand that this south korean government, this south korean president has to respond for domestic, political and other reasons to any future north korean attack? so that's a very important question that we need to understand. beyond that, the united states and the rok have now a joint agreement to consult and map out, if you will, and plan the retaliatory strike to insure that it is mealed and kinetic -- mealed and kinetic and proportional, but also to make sure that we have control. and my sense is it's not clear that pyongyang understands that not only will they be dealing with an rok retaliatory strike, it'll be a combined effort, if you will. it will be planned and consulted between to allies. and i don't know whether pyongyang will stop in the immediate aftermath of that
retaliatory strike, or whether they will then pick up the escalation from that point on. if they do, we've got a major problem on the korean peninsula. >> mike? jonathansome. >> i'll just make a brief comment, and it is to say i personally would wager that the north koreans would do something additional. [laughter] and, you know, people would say, well, may madmen, they're crazy, they don't recognize who they're dealing with, but they also know we don't want war, and they probably feel they can play the brinkmanship game better than we can. and they've probably read thomas shelling and figured out that there's the old statement from the cold war, the threat that leaves something to chance. i think the north koreans are prepared to have this crisis continue to escalate a little, perhaps. at least they may think that they can stomach that, that their nerves are stronger than ours, and that, frankly, it's their own real asset is to play a brinkmanship game. and soim -- so i'm not sure they
can give that up. >> steve? >> presumably, that's also, though, a consideration that south korea and the united states have to factor in. i mean, if you retaliate and then they retaliate and you do nothing, you've, i think, called into question your response. so i think there's this leaving something to chance on both sides. >> right. >> which i think this is why this is risky, because it can quickly spend out of control. >> two other points on this if i could. number one, over the years it's become pretty clear that the north koreans have demonstrated time and again that they are willing to risk more than south korea is willing to risk on the peninsula. that's part of the north korean calculation, that they, their artillery and their forces have the entire population of seoul, south korea, within easy artillery range, and they feel that south korea has more to risk -- more to lose from a confrontation at whatever level than north korea does.
the other problem, and here's one of the big unknowns here, is does north korea think they have south korea and the united states deterred as a result of north korea's development of these medium-range missiles and its crude nuclear weapons capacity? if north korea thinks that it has the united states and south korea deterred as a result of this development, then that does not bode well for this escalatory process because the north koreans may think they can raise the stakes even higher by carrying out another attack ask and not risk the massive retaliation that we are capable of. >> just a couple of points that i would want to make. i mean, one of the things that is always viking about north korean behavior -- striking about north korean behavior is their capacity to find something in the seams, something that is very undermining in the south and the like, but doing it in a way that they think they are free of major consequence in return. so the question is whether that
same script would follow this time. for example, it would seem to me often in the case of their brinksmanship the effort is to perturb the south psychologically, economically and the like. indeed, it may be because you have a tough, determined new leader in south korea that the belief was let's ratchet this up even higher in the expectation that somehow south korea will waver in its commitment and relationship with the united states. i think that's a fundamental miscalculation by north korea, and that will be proven if things go from bad to worse. but, you know, whether it is cyber attacks, whether it is ore ore -- other efforts to rattle nerves in south korea whether momentarily or over the longer run, it's that precise element of unpredictability that i think so many find so jarring and, in some context, leads a lot of people to make arguments that,
well, now is the time we've got to appoint a very, very senior person to go deal with this on an urgent basis which, in a way, is rather affirming to their strategy. so that's an element and policy that we have to discuss. >> we'll get back to that. >> yeah. >> so there is a danger in this current situation. i'd like to turn back to the question of motivations for a minute. jonathan has talked about domestic imperatives at play here, and that rings true to me. mike has talked about the desire to, in effect, desensitize the united states and the international community concern ing further tests of missiles and nuclear weapons. that also makes sense. i wonder if there are other things, and let me just throw one out, and that is to pressure an accommodation from the united states on north korea's terms.
we often say that we are wanting, trying to sharpen north korea's choices. well, they're trying to sharpen ours and give us a choice between our policy of isolation on the one hand and stability in the region, that we can't have both, and we have to choose. so is that going on? >> let me take a shot at that. i think it is, indeed, going on. the north koreans have made it increasingly clear in recent years, including when their vice foreign minister came to new york city last year, that north korea is and intends to remain a nuclear weapons state. and as their vice foreign minister told a group of us in new york city, you need to deal with us as we are, not as you wish us to be. and we are a nuclear weapons state, and the united states and north korea should deal with each other as one nuclear weapon state with another. those are his words, not mine. as i look at this crisis, as i
look at the ramping up of the rhetoric, particularly the nuke-related rhetoric, what i see happening here is a north korean interest in reengaging with us, but reengaging with us on their terms. they want to have a conversation with, certainly, with the united states. i'm less convinced that they want to have this conversation with other participants in this six-party process. they want the benefits that they see that would flow from a possible negotiation with the united states and possibly others, assistance, food, energy, etc. but they want those things, and they want acceptance. it's not recognition, acceptance of their new status as a de facto nuclear weapons state. and in this context it's very interesting, if you've been listening carefully to what secretary can kerry has been saying, he has been suggesting a u.s. willingness to reengage on the basis of the commitments that north korea has already made to denuclearize. well, there's a problem with that.
[laughter] and that is that the north koreans have said, a, we're not going to denuclearize; b, the idea that we would sell our nuclear weapons program or trade it or exchange it for some benefits is off the table. you need to deal with us as we are as a nuclear weapons state. so the united states is interested in having a conversation with a country that wants to have a very different conversation than the one that we're prepared to have. >> okay. any other hypotheses about motivation? >> i just want to build on that point but, again, invoking jonathan pollack's analysis in his book because maybe we need to reform late how we think about denuclearization, and i know, richard, you've encouraged me to think along these lines in the past. our goal needs to be to contain the number they have, convince them that they need to gradually either put a lid on it or maybe even over time ratchet back the number and make sure they don't
build more. because the building more, talk about how this could get worse, if they really reactivate their reactor, if they really expand whatever uranium enrichment capability they have, and they go into the business of making nuclear weapons by the many or even by the dozen for their own purposes or for sale, as people on this panel have argued more eloquently than i, we have a whole different ball game. and so instead of thinking of denuclearization as yes/no, on-off, maybe we need to cap it, but not necessarily get them to promise to a zero number anytime soon because that's probably unrealistic. and i know i've been the person who's probably held on to the zero goal as much as anybody on this panel. but i think given where we are what we have to do is be realistic in the first steps and as they have the potential to go into a large arsenal, make sure they don't do that. >> okay. i'd like to bore in on a couple of issues -- >> you should push back.
>> -- and the first of -- >> richard, could we maybe push back on that notion a little bit? >> okay. >> the idea that you can put in place an agreement with the north koreans that would limit their improvement of their arsenals, i think we need to look at this, drill down on this a little bit more. let's remember that the bush administration's negotiation, the six-party talks with the north koreans broke down over the question of verification, getting into north korea and having a high level of credibility, if you will, and believability that they had, indeed, stopped their nuclear weapons program. we have a big problem here in that they are working on the uranium enrichment program as we now know. they have shown it to us. there is no doubt in a number of minds of american analysts they have the facility at the nuclear complex, but they probably have other similar programs elsewhere. how do you find them? how do you make sure that the
north koreans are not making more fissile material for nuclear weapons? how do you make sure that they are not making improvements to the existing weapons somehow you put together a verification agreement with the north koreans when they've made it very clear as they did in 2008 that they are prepared to throw away an agreement with the united states over the issue of verification. this is one of the most closed countries in the world. the idea that any north korean regime is going to agree to allow american inspectors to snoop in every nook and cranny and cave and put together an agreement with the united states that implements this idea, i'm sympathetic to the goal, but i just don't see how you can get there from here. jonathan may have -- >> we can even take it back a step farther to the agreed framework period where you could argue in a literal sense north korea was honoring more or less the terms of the agreement. that's the good news. the bad news is suns uranium --
since uranium enrichment was not precluded in the agreement, it's clear in retrospect, and i certainly, we don't have that full story laid out, but the evidence is very suggestive even in the clinton administration there was a recognition that there was growing evidence of exploratory activities and so forth of enrichment as an option because that wasn't part of the agreed framework. so, you know, in a way it was a very artful move. i mean, i do think that the north koreans often are very, very literal about and very, very specific be about what their presumed obligations are. but, again, this issue of verification which has stymied any kind of genuine progress, and by genuine progress i mean steps definitively to preclude further nuclear weapons development. we've soon this movie too many times and, of course, it leads to, shall we say, enormous skepticism about the virtue as
of this kind of approach one more time. >> steve? >> yeah. just to be clear, i think if we had confidence that we knew all the facilities, the technical challenge of monitoring and verifying that they're not enriching uranium, you know, that's manageable. the question is at the end of the day, do we know and are we confident that north korea has told us every particular site? i think with the arrangement we had on plutonium, you know, we were pretty confident that we could monitor the reactor. it was always the other places that they never told us about. >> right, right. >> having spent hundreds, if not thousands of hours across the table from the north koreans, let me tell you, your skepticism would be justified. but let me go back to this question of verification again. keep in mind that until dr. hecker was allowed to visit the uranium enrichment facility, we had no idea as a government where the facility was. we suspected that there was one. and then we discovered that the north koreans had managed to
build a state-of-the-art uranium enrichment city right in the mid old of -- in the middle of the complex. >> under our nose z. >> under our noses. it was an up and running, state of the art facility. dr. hecker, who knows something about these things, was given a tour of it and came away impressed and overwhelmed by its sophistication. and literally for anybody who's been to the facility, this is one of the most closely-watched places in the world in terms of u.s. intelligence assets. the north koreans built it right there. and so you have to be very, very skeptical about our ability to verify things. >> just a last point on this. i take all those observations, but you also observed correctly, evans, at the beginning that we have this official policy now where we say you have to commit to denuclearization before talks can begin when they're obviously not interested in that as a premise. >> sure. >> so i'm just suggesting -- i
take your points, but maybe there isn't going to be american inspectors. maybe it's going to be chinese inspectors, and maybe we have to accept all the uncertainties that go along with that. or maybe we're going to have to figure out what we can tell by how much, you know, sheet metal they're properly machining for building more centrifuges, and if we can monitor and limit that in an agreement, that may be the best we can do. i don't know the answers, but it does strike me they're doing things we don't know about, they're building up this arsenal, and we're at a loss with the current method. so i'm just suggesting we may need to broaden our scope a little. >> okay. let me turn to some more specific questions. the first is, essentially, a factual one. and that is for steve and, mike, if he wants: what exactly are the capabilities of north korean missiles? >> well, first, i think there is a reason for concern, but there's also a fair amount of hyperbole about what north korea
can and cannot do. and in essence, to have a nuclear-armed ballistic missile, north korea has to master three challenges. first, it has to have a nuclear device. second, it has to be able to miniaturize that device so it can fit on a ballistic missile warhead and withstand the thermal and mechanical stresses that a warhead goes through during the course of flight. and, third, north korea needs to have a ballistic missile that works rebuyly. so -- reliably. first of all, they clearly have a nuclear device. they've done three nuclear tests since 2006. i think most regard the first test and perhaps the second test as partial failures. but the third the test appeared to be more successful. so they have tested a nuclear device. but what we don't know is exactly what they tested. we don't know, for example, how big it was. they've talked about moving towards a miniaturized weapon, but we don't know the size of the devices that were used including in 2013. and typically for other states,
i mean, the way the united states went, the way russia went, other countries have gone, the first test typically was anywhere from 4-7 tons. that would not fit on a ballistic missile except, perhaps, the ss-18 that the soviets and russians had. certainly nothing the north koreans could carry. they have a nuclear device. how big it is, we don't know. the second question is putting this into a warhead. and that also is a very demanding technical challenge because it's not only miniaturizing it, but also being able to withstand the stresses that you go through in acceleration and then reentry into the atmosphere. and the thermal challenges. so, for example, when you're talking about an intercontinental ballistic missile warhead, that reenters at about a speed of 5-7 kilometerser if second, that's up to 15,000 miles an hour, and that puts a lot of stress on the warhead. so you've got to be able to have a weapon that is miniaturized but also can survive and function in a very stressful environment. and the important thing here is
that in terms of their test history, north korea has never successfully tested a ballistic missile warhead to a range greater than 1300 kilometers. okay, then the third challenge is what missiles they have and what can they do. at the low end of the scale, the north koreans have 5-600 swan missiles which are basically a variant of the scud first flown by the soviets pack in the 1950s. and those give north korea the ability to cover targets pretty much in most of south korea. then there's the no-dong missile which has a range of 1300 kilometers, that allows coverage of targets in japan as well as south korea. but when you move beyond that, you get into a series of missiles that really cannot be regarded as proven. the focus of the last couple of weeks has been on this missile, two were reportedly moved towards the coast of north korea. there was some speculation that today in honor of the birthday there might be a launch. in this missile's supposed to have a range of about
3,000-3,200 kilometers. it's never been test flown. we've never seen it fly. another missile with a range of 2200 kilometers, it's been tested or flown once in 1998 as a space launch vehicle, and the third stage failed. we've watched the type dong ii missile, that's been tested five times over the last six, seven years either as a ballistic missile or a space launch missile. it's one for phi. the only successful flight was in december where it put a satellite into orbit. reportedly, the satellite is tumbling uselessly and is not doing anything. but that's also a very different problem than putting a warhead up there -- putting a satellite in space as opposed to putting a warhead up and getting it back down. and then the last missile was paraded with some attention last year in pyongyang. again, it's never been flight tested. and there's some speculation on the outside when people look at the pictures, they're saying,
you know, does this look like a real missile or just a mock up? there are some questions about the north korean test program and how reliable these missiles, particularly longer range would be. and just to give you some context, what other countries had to go through. the atlas was the first american intercontinental ballistic missile. it went through 135 tests before it was declared operational. the soviets' first icbm went through 90 tests before it was seen as operational. and even in the 1980s when the u.s. was much smarter about ballistic missiles, the try dent ii ballistic missiles went through 30 development tests before operational. so this is rocket science. and you really have to ask yourself the question, are north korean engineers so good that they can glean from a handful of tests or one test or in some cases no tests information about these missiles that would give them confidence that it could be
reliably used? now, i'm not saying we shouldn't be or concerned, and i think the north koreans are making progress. but i think it's important to keep this all in perspective. and when you look at it, and i will defer to people who are much smarter on north korea than i am, but it does seem to me that a good part of north korean foreign policy is based on bluster. and so if that is your strategy, you know, maybe -- it's less important that the rockets really work, or maybe they don't work at all. that's less important than if you can make people -- and perhaps your own population -- think that they work. >> could i -- i think steve has made some very, very apt points. this is rocket science, and it's not easy. if there is any good news in this story, and i use that term advisedly, it's the fact that north korea's industrial capacities to test on a regular basis and so forth are probably very constrained. because you don't see -- i'm not trying to say it has to be
totally equivalent to the kinds of program that is we ran or the russians ran, but this is not what i would regard as a true testing program, and it's just not frequent enough, it's not intense enough to quantify. that said, the challenge here is maybe less what the north koreans may believe they have. it may be more what we believe they have and how we respond accordingly. and i must say there's a real art form on the part of this in terms of how north korea sells its wares or advertises its wares, should i say. sometimes in very obscure ways. i mean, evans noted, for example, that dr. hecker went to the facility, and i might add not only under our noses, it is with this glorious new blue roof over this reconstructed, reconfigured building. he was the first and still to this point last western visitor
to observe the enrichment facility. we do not know what is going on under the roof of that glorious building. we do not know what is or is not going on in other facilities elsewhere in north korea. and it's much to dr. hecker's frustration, but the north koreans won't let him back in. maybe he disclosed a little too much the last time. so that's all part of this -- >> and this is, i think, the good news about rockets a as opposed to how blew plutonium if you're going to launch a rocket given the radar coverage that north korea has mow, we're probably going to have a chance to see it. now, it doesn't preclude the north koreans, for example, from doing tests underground of the engine and such, but be you really want to have confidence, i think most americans would say i want to fly it a few times. >> absolutely. >> and that should be very, very visible. >> well, just one point on that. i think it's important to keep in mind that a number of the new systems the north koreans are
developing are road mobile systems. so under certain conditions we might not see these systems being ramped up and ready for launch. that's one thing to keep in mind. another thing to keep in mind going back to the visit to the nuclear facility by dr. hecker and his team, when the former u.s. director of the los angeles nuclear weapons laboratory goes to north korea, los alamos, i'm sorry, and sees what he describes as a state of the art uranium enrichment facility, it ought to remind us not to underestimate the technical capabilities of north korea. we've been guilty of doing that in the past, and we just need to be very careful on this point. >> jonathan, let's move to china which is, obviously, a very important factor here in terms of its political influence, in terms of the implementation of sanctions and so on. china itself has a new leader.
what do he can and his colleagues think about this situation unfolding before their eyes? >> i think that this test may be, or in this series of events may be different as seen by the chinese both because there is a new leadership in china and that kim jong un and those around him, whoever he may be listening to, have decided to challenge the chinese on the fundamentals. the chinese have tried repeatedly, and and it's a record unblemished by success -- [laughter] going back to the time of kim jung-il's stroke to make, in effect, an investment, a political investment and to some extent an economic investment in the north on the belief that a new leader would not necessarily replicate and further pursue what his father in particular had done and his grandfather as
well. and at first i think that the chinese saw a reason to kind of get, in effect, a bit of entry into the north korean system if they could on the basis of this new leader who at least at first made some other noises. in fact, i would argue that the united states made a very, very similar calculation. if you look at the february 29th agreement, it was premised on the idea that, you know, let's see whether or not a new leader will divest himself of what proceeded and see whether or not there's some kind of a basis on which negotiation can proceed. the problem be, unfortunately, is that after some modest signals recognizing that young mr. kim is a very extroverted individual, he resembles his grandfather in eerie kinds of ways, his father was much more introverted. but what we see now be, and i
think that this is what is particularly distressing to the chinese leadership, is having made this investment you're in the same position where you cannot take the north koreans at their word. for example, the chinese elevated a new politburo in the party congress in november. one of the members of the new politboro traveled to north korea in weeks following that, had discussions with the north in a visible kind of way, and he even came carrying some kind of a letter. we're not quite sure what the content of that letter might have been. yet again he raised what his predecessors had raised with the north koreans, with kim jung-il time and time again, we want a predictable relationship with the north. if you've got some kind of an urgent situation or are planning something big, we need to know about it. of course, they were never told really in advance. so he returns home, and within a
matter of days the north koreans announce that they're going to launch a satellite. this offends the chinese in the all kinds of ways, and the question is with si jinping, if you will, a new sheriff in town, will the rendering on this be different? precisely because now for the first time the chinese are acknowledging the extent to which what north korea is doing is directly affecting their vital security interests. they're not defending the north koreans in the same way anymore. they're not even making kinds of accusations directed that much against the united states. i would argue the chinese have been very temp rate in their -- them por rate in their reactions to the american military deployments prompted by the added north korean behavior. this may be to some extent things we've told the chinese to keep them fully informed that it
is not directed against them. but, you know, the chinese can connect the gots here. if you now have adrive arrived at -- arrived at the conclusion that north korean by whatever means what wants an operational nuclear deterrent, that is, to say the least, deeply vexing to the chinese and leads them to think, i think, about this relationship in, potentially in very, very different fashion. it does not mean that the chinese are going to cut north koreans loose, but the chinese, i believe, are actively deliberating how do they impose costs on the north for its behavior? because it's really harming their interests in a palpable way. >> okay. um, i'd like to turn to one of the reasons that china is probably concerned about this, the trend, and that is the implications for regional peace and security. i'd like steve to talk first about something called extended
deterrence, and then evans to talk about a related topic and sort of proposals we're hearing in south korea that maybe it's time for us to get nuclear weapons too. >> okay. well, unextended deterrence, the basic idea of deterrence is to persuade a potential adversary that the risks and costs of his or her preferred action are all out of proportion to any possible gains he or she might hope to achieve. extended deterrence is a bit more difficult. i think it's fairly easy for the united states to persuade another country that a nuclear attack on the united states or a major attack on the united states runs the risk of a nuclear response. what the united states has tried to do going back really to the late 1950s is extend that nuclear deterrent to cover allies, basically to persuade potential add very adversaries -- in this case north korea -- that an attack on south korea could run the risk of an attack of military
response up to and including nuclear weapons. it was designed to discourage weapons from achieving their own capability. i think australia as well considered in the late 1960s having an independent nuclear weapons capability. so part of the extended deterrence challenge is not just to train the foe, but assuring your ally that, yes, the american commitment is there, and it's solid. and up until the early 1990s, the extended deterrent in south korea was actually supported by the presence of american nuclear weapons on the korean peninsula and also onboard u.s. navy submarines and surface ships in the western pacific. now, those were actually withdrawn by a decision under president george h.w. bush, but at that point there was a very clear message that, one, the united states' strategic nuclear forces based in the u.s. would
extend the deterrent, and the united states also retained the capability if need be to deploy back in the region a nonstrategic or tactical weapons capability. and in 2010 when it put out its nuclear posture view, among other thing, that calls on the u.s. military to maintain those capabilities both to deploy strategic weapons if necessary, and i don't think it was any accident that the u.s. air force chose to fly two b-2s over south korea two weeks ago. but also in the nuclear posture is this idea of having a capability to forward deploy into the area dual capable tactical aircraft if necessary, although i don't think anybody's talking about that at this point. that's one of the things the administration's trying to do. it's also trying to do this in the context where the administration would like to more broadly reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the arsenal and also reduce american reliance on it. so there's a bit of a tension between, on the one hand,
reducing fluke lahr weapons, reducing the overall security strategy while still communicating to south korea that that nuclear deterrent is still there and in particular south korea does not need to develop its own nuclear weapons capability. >> on that last point, evans, would you like to offer reasons why? >> i'm certainly not going to defend the view because i think it borders on the irresponsible, quite frankly. >> why not? >> the notion that south korea needs nuclear weapons, to me, which is an argument that's been made by a very small number of academics and a few politicians in south korea, and it's certainly not a mainstream view in terms -- and certainly not the south korean government's view -- is, to me, a potential to make, has the potential to make an already difficult situation incredibly more difficult than northeast asia. the international non-proliferation regime is already under aact, if you will, by -- attack, the you will, by
irresponsible countries like north korea, and the idea that you would spread nuclear weapons to get another party, to me, would with undermine the international non-proliferation regime that much further. beyond that, as my colleague has already eloquently stated, there is a deterrent in place that is more than adequate to the task of deterring north korea, and if deterrence fails, in dealing with north korea using all of the assets if our strategic arsenal -- in our strategic arsenal. and our south korean allies know this and, i believe, accept this. i think it's very important at this stage of the game to insure that there is the utmost confidence in that extended deterrent by our south korea allies and our japanese allies as well. and i think that the obama administration with the b-52 deployments, with the b-2 deployments and other statements we've made have done exactly that. that's the right way to do it, to respond to this crisis. not by making it even more complicated by reintroducing nuclear weapons onto the korean
peninsula or having the rok develop its own nuclear weapons program. >> okay, thanks. we've spent a lot of time analyzing the situation, and now we want to turn at the end to what to do about it. and evans has made the important point that, um, as much as one would like a role for diplomacy and negotiated sort of solution or management of these problems, the conversation that the united states wants to have now quite different from the conversation that north korea is willing to have. and vice versa. so the question then is, are there specific things that might be done to get us off this dime and produce a more useful and mutually beneficial, mutually acceptable conversation? and to start i'd like to turn to mike who's write about this. >> thanks, richard. just one idea. again, this is to add to the mix, and i know we all are
cognizant of the need to be reflexive, excuse me, to be adaptive to whatever circumstances may present themselves, not to prescript our entire response now. but i does strike me if we see another major sustain provocation, one idea we might want to con contemplate is the a of what i would call temporary sanctions, or sunsetting sanctions which would, basically, be in force for two or three years. they would be additional to all the existing sanctions which i don't propose reformulating, and those are essentially written in an indefinite way. there's no time period at which they expire, and i don't think there should be until we get to a better place in our overall relationship with north korea. but let's say there's a nuclear test this summer. i think under these circumstances we might want to consider the idea of additional, fairly tough sanctions but ones that would last for a couple of years. to me, there are two big
advantages to this. one, i think it's easier to get the chinese onboard this kind of idea and, secondly, i think it's easier to give the north koreans an incentive to backtrack from the continual provocations. because the additional sanctions only expire if the provocations stop. so if the tests continue or if there's another lethal use of force, for example, then you would continue to see these sanctions kept in place. and so i would just want to add that to the mix of concepts we might want to contemplate. let's hope we don't have to go there, let's hope the chinese are already doing some quiet things perhaps, maybe they persuaded the north koreans not to launch today, who knows to whom we owe that temporary reprieve. maybe it's just temporary. but maybe we're already at a point where the north koreans feel they've done enough and we can get back to normal diplomacy. but if i'm right to worry, there could be another nuclear test later this year. i would just want to add that notion of temporary sanctions to policy tool kit we might want to contemplate. >> okay, thanks. evans, you've had a specific
idea in this regard. >> yeah. let me begin by saying that one of the more successful encounters that we had with the north koreans over the years that we've been talking to them was when former secretary of defense perry went to pyongyang in the spring of 999, and i was with him on that mission. one of the things on the table there was a very sharp set of choice that is we laid out for the north koreans. we presented two paths for north korea to travel down. one of them was the path of engagement and cooperation and dialogue and denuclearization, and the other part we summed up, essentially, by saying you don't want to go there. but bill perry made it very clear what that other path might entail for north korea. so it seems to me that if and when -- and i hope it's when rather than if -- we get back to some sort of a negotiation with the north koreans, it's going to be absolutely critical for us to sharpen north korea's choices, to make it as clear as possible the dangers that they're running by their pursuit of nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile capability and the fact that the united states has not yet by any means exhausted the policy options that are open to us including covert activities, including efforts to destabilize north korea, including at the end of the day perhaps even engaging in a policy of regime change. but the message to the north koreans ought to be you don't want to go there and to make that choice as crystal clear as possible for the north koreans. now, the problem is getting from here back to the table with the north koreans. you certainly don't want to create the impression, either the united states or the rok for that matter, that somehow by getting back to the table we're yielding to north korean pressure and blackmail here. we certainly don't want that to happen. but at the end of the day, if and when we can get back to the table with north koreans, the choice needs to be as starkly laid out for them as possible, and can one of the other lessons that we've learned or at least that i've learned over many, many years of talking to the north koreans is that over the
years we've been talking to the wrong people in pyongyang, quite frankly. we haven't been talking to the leadership and the folks who make the decisions regarding matters of life and death in north korea and nuclear weapons are regarded as a matter of life and death in north korea. so conversations with north korean diplomats, always a wonderful thing to sit down across the table from my old friends, but you're not going to get any traction with them as we have now discovered. if you're going to get any traction, and i'm not saying that this is for sure that we will, you need to be engaged with the people who make the decisions. and to lay out this very stark choice to the leadership. and they have a couple of choices at that point. take it or not. be they take it, it's win/win. we're back engaged in a denuclearization process. i'm rather pessimistic, but i also feel that the goal of denuclearization so important that we ought to give it a shot at the the appropriate moment. and if we can get back to the
table and they accept this notion of a dialogue based on denuclearization, based on the implementation of their commitments, there is progress to be made. but as i said, the alternative for them is to say, no, no thanks. at that point the united states has some very tough decisions to make including going down the darker path that bill perry laid out for the north koreans back in may of 1999. >> okay. >> without being overly flippant, there are elements in what evans just said that we might call the rodman strategy. [laughter] >> do tell. >> but to be serious, to me some of the most interesting options that are likely to prevail in this new she of is circumstances -- set of circumstances are going to be questions of whether we can engage more fully with china. the challenge always with north
korea is to to deny them in i kind of can -- any kind of political space that enables them to operate in a relatively unconstrained manner s. i don't want to say that china over the years has given north korea something of a get out of jail free card, but there is that, there is that element. in other words, as long as pressures don't so impinge that north korea does not recognize, does not see an absence of any -- well, let me rephrase this. that as long as north korea understands there are not ready alternatives, there are not escape valves of one kind of another, then you might under those circumstances see them more prepared to inhibit what they do. i mean, that's a supposition i'm making. i'm not saying there are any guarantees here. but that it does seem to me -- and i think we're seeing some indications of this from secretary kerry's visit to
beijing -- that some of what we're hearing from the chinese is much more of a willingness now to look at a u.s./china conversation about north korea in a variety of scenarios in order to limit the risks and do whatever is possible to both inhibit their future of weapons development and to make very, very clear to the north that we're not going to validate these capabilities and nor are the chinese. so this is something that i suspect the administration is going to work quite a bit on in the months to come. that's been a very tough nut to crack, if you will. the chinese have been very resistant to these kinds of discussions to this point. but i think that the indications are growing that china feels it is time to start that conversation. that will send a very, very interesting signal to the north, and in my view, it's really worth a try. >> okay. thanks a lot. we have a spore gas board of material on the table. there's some things we missed.
time for questions. a couple of rules. first of all, wait for the mic. then identify yourself. pose your intervention in the form of a question. keep it brief. all my colleagues are really smart. they don't need a long windup. so we'll start with jim goodbee and then chris nelson. the mic is coming. over there. >> thank you. well, thank you all for a terrific set of comments. you asked whether there was something left out. i think there was one point that i regard as tremendously important that was left out, and that is the closing -- at least temporarily -- of cay song. cay song complex. that, to me, is the most notable difference between this crisis and all previous ones. and at least to even ask to we really know who's in charge? who are the right people to talk
to? in the early days of the kim jong un administration, there was some talk about market economy, small farmers and so forth having nor -- more rights. that's all disappeared. it that he discovered -- is it that he discovered that was something he had to back down? these are questions in my mind that i wonder if you could comment at least on the question of cay song and whether that isn't a fairly significantly difference from previous episodes we faced. thank you will have. >> jim raises a valid point. there was a tinkering once before with cay song, but this seems much more determined in terms of what north korea has done. it presumably harms their desire for generating a certain amount of currency earnings and so forth. i think add to this even if forsake of argument that north korea decides that they decide
to reopen the conflicts, and it wouldn't surprise me at all that that kind of an initiative is made particularly after the u.s./rok exercises wind down. whether or not south korean businesses will see, will have enough confidence that they would wish to reopen it under those circumstances, it seems to me, is an open question. and that's something, frankly, that the administration is going to have to contemplate. that, that said, it does seem to me that, you know, we all try to understand who's making the decisions, and in the absence of other evidence to the contrary, i would have to say that it is, indeed, kim john unand a small -- kim jong un and a small circle around him. i would rather that we look at what i'll call behavioral outcomes and not tie ourselves too much up in knots over who might be making these ultimate decisions because we don't have
that kind of access. we don't have that kind of an understanding. and north korea goes to very ample lengths to deny anyone, if particular the chinese, that kind of knowledge of what is driving their policy. it is something in their tip bag of options that they figured might be undertaken. and if i hook at the signals coming -- if i look at the signals coming out from north korean statements, the presumption, i think, must be that this will be seen as such a definitive action on their part that it would be the last bit of any kind of meaningful cooperation between north and south, that that is going to so vex the south korean leader and those around her that they will somehow rethink their strategy. i don't think that's the case, but that's certainly what i think may be operative here in terms of north korean thinking. >> evans? >> if i could, just a quick
couple of points on this question of leadership and who's if charge, no doubt in my mind that kim jong un is in charge. the dynamic way in which he has taken control of the reins of the party, the military and the state structure last year, the smoothness of the implementation of the transition to him, the fact that he has been able to remove a number of key players so readily including military people and replace them with his own loyalists and implement this generational change, if you will, of the leadership in the military, etc., all of those things and much more suggest to me that this is a person who despite his youth, despite his relative inexperience is definitely in charge. on the cay song issue, going back to one of the opening points that jonathan made earlier in which he noted that north korea has qualified all of its threats by saying that if the other side does a, we will do b, they've also done it with cay song as well. they have not shut down cay song. they have made it very clear
that there is a suspension of operations and that it's all south korea's fault. and to me, that suggests that they're keeping the door open to a possible restart of the cay song operation. but in the meantime, just to remind everybody in this room that all of the small and medium enterprises, south korean enterprises that are being hurt by the temporary shutdown, i hope, of cay song are insured. they're insured by the south korean government and other mechanisms. the 53,000 north korean workers who will not be getting their salaries and the several hundred thousand north korean family members who are dependent on those workers, i don't think they have an insurance plan. so the ultimate damage that is going to be done here by and large, i think, is going to be to north korea and to those workers who will not be happy. >> if i could just make one other point here, and i'm glad that evans raised these points. one thing the north koreans have not yet done is burn bridges
personally with the south korean leer. >> they've come close. >> they've come close, but they're not over the edge yet. and, again, they're very aftful about the way these things are done. at first they did the same thing. it took them, you know, a few months to get a head of steam up and, basically, contend -- so they have to be asking do they take steps now that, in effect, rule out any kind of relationship with he were and that they -- with her and that they will persist down that past for the next four and three-quarter years, in other words, her term in office? we'll have to wait and see, but i'm just struck they're not quite there yet. and we need to watch that carefully in the coming weeks and months. >> chris nelson? >> thanks very much. great discussion, guys. chris nelson, nelson report. jonathan, as usual, you anticipated the bulk of my question, but i wanted to
lead -- i found myself very close mike o'hanlon's thinking on the notion of if they -- in a sense, he's saying if they keep testing, sooner or later the da is going to be right, you know? we all may be retired by then, but we know what's going to happen if they keep testing. so he's arguing, you know, maybe we have to swallow hard and figure out a way to really talk to these guys. you guys have, i think, very successfully pointed out that as long as we're just talking to diplos, we never quite get to the decision makers. and as jonathan pointed out so far dennis rodman's the only guy who's done it. not only is that a psychological bullet we've got to bite, but we've got to figure out a way to talk to the guy in charge. so to jonathan's point just now, south korean president has said she is willing to directly engage the new kid, and it doesn't have to be about denuclearization. she wants to talk about
north/south issues. is that the door into getting a process going that we can then join, okay? especially, jonathan, if you're right, what i've been calling the china chi her rah, maybe it's becoming a little bit more of a reality. we had the people's daily editorial last week which was pretty tough, not tough on us and really an know dine on everybody else. so let's hope you're right. so maybe if we let the south koreans take the initiative, see how things go, you know, we get a combination of of the to o'hanlon initiative and the rodman initiative, and hopefully steve is right. >> if i could, i think that -- i really think that the rok needs to be the lead actor in this process. as i am fond of saying, this is, after all, the korean peninsula.
it's not the american peninsula, it's not the chinese peninsula, the it's not the japanese peninsula either. and so, therefore, something that is configured around the central role of the rok plays here not only vis-a-vis the north, but interestingly, vis-a-vis china. xi jinping had a 20 minute conversation on the phone with pac unihay whom i understand speaks rather good chinese for added measure. they mutually invited one another on visits. this is not the kind of stuff that's going on between by jake and pyongyang right now. young mr. kim does not have an invitation to visit beijing, nor are chinese officials particularly welcome to go to north korea. so i'm saying that seoul has a distinctive relationship here, a distinctive set of possibilities that we ought to be prepared to hear out if they've got a different way of coming at these issues. because it is my view that sooner or later after the war
fever subsides -- that's my optimistic conclusion, of course -- it would not surprise me if north makes another run at some trying to open door toss the south. that may be seen as a more attractive possibility than, you know, reaching out to the united states even if you want the united states somehow to validate you as an international actor. and i just don't see the obama administration doing that. i'm not trying to say that she will give in lightly here. it's more could there be ways in which some of the goals that she did articulate as a candidate could be pursued prudently, carefully as an alternative path that might be worth a try? might be worth a shot? >> when you say she, you mean president park, not xi jinping. >> yes, thank you. [laughter] well, it could be a she/xi
strategy. [laughter] >> evans? >> since we're talking about various initiatives, let me throw out for your consideration the let's throw cold water on this initiative, just to be devil's advocate just for a second. just to remind everyone that, first of all, to be perfectly clear here, i'm a very strong advocate of south/north dialogue. the north korean reaction to that was almost unprincipled. so that's part of the problem. the south koreans -- the north koreans may be willing to have a conversation with south korea, but not about nuclear matters, number one. number two, the north koreans are deeply uncomfortable with
the notion of putting south korea in the lead. as much as i would support that notion. and so that's another problem. the north koreans, to the extent that they want to have a conversation about strategic issues including nuclear issues and the conversation that they want to have is to get the united states to accept them as a nuclear weapons state, they want to have that conversation preferably with us. and so this is something to keep in mind as we're thinking about alternative mechanisms for get withing back to the table. having said that, i'm very comfortable with south korea reaching out to the north. i just don't think it's going to have the desired effect on what for the united states is the central issue, the nuclear issue. >> um, richard shin, sort of four rows back and -- >> hi, richard shin with the economist incorporated. going back to motivation for north korean behavior, we talked
about a lot of different issues, but the question is does kim jong un have consolidated power, or is it just the process of getting there. and i think evans made a point that he has consolidated, and it's still part of that consolidation that's going on, or is it just simply rattling of sabers that's been going on for years and except that we have a new leader in pyongyang, new leader in south korea, few leader in the china and new sanctions, u.n. sanctions, and it's making it much more of a more widely -- it's just, basically, it has upped the ante in that sense. now, the follow-up question to that is regardless of what happened, it seems to me that north korea and kim jong un has gotten himself into a corner. and he doesn't have too many responses. i mean, you know, typically we would think of, well, you know, limited military engagement. now south korea's rules of
engagement have changed, they have repositioned all these generals who are more willing to take risks in firing back. so, you know, that option should be very risky for north korea. you know, firing missiles, i mean, u.n., u.s. patriot missiles are there. it may fail. i mean, all kinds of things that's in the korean press in terms of what north korea can respond, they simply don't make sense. and so the question is, you know, how can kim jong un get himself out of this corner, and how can we help him so that he would alleviate the current crisis we face? >> quickly on the first question, the consolidation of power in north korea is an ongoing process. it's going to the take more time. i think he's done a successful job by north korean standards in getting to where he is now. but he still needs to demonstrate his bone my disas a leader, as a person who is in command in every sense of the word in north korea. what better way to do that boast
domestically and internationally than to take the united states on in the current crisis and show how tough and firm you are and how you can take things to the brink? and if you can get the united states and others to come to the table in response to these threats and begin offering inducements to north korea to stop the behavior, you've committed two major goals here. you've reached two major goals. so i think that's percent of the game -- part of the game that's being played here. one of the things i used to say as we were negotiating with the north koreans over the years was that they were masters of getting themselves painted into a corner. on many occasions at the negotiating table, they would create a rob for themselves -- a problem for themselves and then would rely on us to get them out of it. this happened in '94, in '98, it happened in 2000, it happened in 2005. and all too often we have sort of fallen over ourselves to get them out of the, out of the bind that they're in. and maybe that's what the north koreans want now is for us to
get them out of the corner that they have painted themselves into. and my sense is we need to be very careful, because we don't want to encourage this kind of behavior if and when we do come back to the table. >> if i could add to this, i said before i thought that this was largely a self-generated crisis for domestic purposes. therefore, i'm going to give you a minimalist way out that kim jong un could do this. the claim in all their prop propaganda is that the united states is plotting and scheming so that we can launch a nuclear war against the north. we're not going to launch a nuclear war against the north. kim jong un in time-honored fashion could declare, if you'll pardon the expression, mission accomplished. he can have a glorious parade in kim ill sung square because yet again because of the determination and the strength of north korea, the americans have been held at bay one more
time through our determinationing and through the great wisdom of our leader. i'll give you that scenario. i'll give you reasonable odds on that scenario coming sometime in the next month. >> and the threats to fire nuclear weapons at the united states are part of that. >> yeah. oh, sure. oh, sure, that's definitely -- because it all fits, it's all of a piece. it legitimates what you're doing in the first place. you present yourself to your own citizens who, you know, we have no way to independently measure how they view all of this. but the presumption of a war footing in the north so deeply embedded in the history of this state even, for example, i might note that in the recent party conference where the claim was where we will now give coequal status to economic development and to military development, that is right out of his grandfather's playbook. he did this in 1962 which was the time that north korea went to full militarization, and
they're doing the same thing now. so one way or another it all has a kind of a reinforcing tendency that will presumably you will try to sell to your own citizens. it's a question of whether or not they buy it. >> okay. garrett mitchell. >> thanks very much. i'm garrett mitchell, and i write the mitchell report which i will note comes just before the nelson report in the alphabet. [laughter] but only in the alphabet. not subscribers. [laughter] um, it's a two-part question. i think they're linked. the first is to ask, um, why was bill perry wrong in the op-ed that he wrote however long ago it was about what we should do with respect to north korea? and, second -- and this comes from a session that steve led a
short time ago on iran at which javier solano said as i recall it, the threshold of international approbation in dealing with issues of this magnitude is rising, getting tougher, i think is a fair assessment of what he said. so i'm interested to get your perspective collectively on, on perry's policy recommendation and whether or not a policy with respect to the dprk from the u.s. point of view can be arrived at without some calculation about the strategy for dealing with the iran nuclear challenge. ..
military in korea. the very first image that came to mind was not the likely successful strikes on the facilities at john boehner or missile facilities but what happens next. -- so the image to me especially as some of the family members, the immediate devastation of significant portion in seoul, south korea, by north korean artillery. then leading to a broader peninsula conflict in which hundreds of thousands of people
would die. there was no question about who would prevail in this conflict and there's no question i think today, we are even more capable than we were back then. as a way of sending a very blunt message to the north koreans about what u.s. options were, i thought perhaps it was a helpful thing to have said at the time. and i think the b-52 and b-2 flyovers the other day sent a similar message, but once again, consequences, these things have consequences. and are we prepared to run those risks, and our south korean allies prepared to risk those consequences by taking actions along those lines? i have some doubts about that. there may come a time, i hope it never arises, where we have to think about options like that again. but in the meantime there are other policies, avenues that should be pursued before we get to that point.
>> i certainly, one of the challenges for the administration is how do you orchestrate your policy on north korea with your policy on iran. i find mike's idea about perhaps excepting north korea -- [inaudible] some capability. but i think one thing we be concerned about, that perhaps we are weakening. the other difference i think you find between the two cases is the administration i think state believes that there is, a., a bigger risk in iran going nuclear. because i think with the north korean case there's a question south korea, japan maybe but low probability. but i think if you look at iran, what do the saudis do, what do the egyptians do or the turks do? we have a nonproliferation which is under great stress. i think the assessment is that iran going nuclear probably is more stressful to that region.
that's not saying the north korean case is a good one for the regime. but iran is perhaps more of a problem. the other thing you have in the case of iran is in part because the iranian economy, although it's not fully integrated in the global economy is more than the north korean economy. so you have had more tools. over the last three years in addition to the sanctions that were imposed by the u.n. security council, the united states and european union, japan impose additional sanctions in a way that i think have inflicted economic pain on iran. that was easier to do because iran have those connections to the global economy. one of the challenges with north korea as we don't have those same sorts of leverage. >> the woman in the back, in the very back. >> hi. despite secretary kerry's recent reassertion that we never accept
north korea as a nuclear power, to any of you foresee sort of an eventual five year, 10 years shift in u.s. or chinese policy excepting north korea as a de facto nuclear state? and maybe a thought experiment, what would the ramifications of this system be, not just for the nonproliferation regime that possibly for north korea in action over negotiations? >> i think with all of you all want to jump in on this but can i just share with you what i see as the central take away for me from this ongoing crisis and it relates directly to this. there are some who are arguing it is time to acknowledge the obvious as some people put it that north korea has nuclear weapons and is not going to trade him, and we got to somehow not necessarily accept them or acknowledged them as a nuclear weapons state, but basically live with us this for a long time an and hope that some only compound the problem, et cetera, et cetera.
the central take away from this crisis to me, this goes back to the very first question richard post, is that we now know very clearly what north koreans tensions are when they have full-fledged medium and long range ballistic missile capability, and when they have a full-fledged nuclear weapons program, meaning deliverable nuclear weapons, and they are well on the way to reaching that point. the north koreans in recent weeks have made it very clear for the international community what they plan to do with these weapons. as i said earlier they don't have yet have capability to hit colorado springs. they barely don't even have the capability of knowing where it is on the map as we have seen, but they have now said very bluntly and very clearly our intention is to strike. and you can write down the list of targets that they've laid out. so for anyone who is making the case that somehow we should
accept or acknowledge or deal with or live with a nuclear armed north korea, think about that. use the north koreans own words and stated intentions about this is where they are going and these are what, this is what they intend to do with these capabilities in a few years ti time. >> i basically agree, and yet i find we're in a conundrum. because this has been our policy, my preference, most of yours probably. and yet meanwhile, the north koreans keep building up the arsenal. and so the question is how do we try to at least arrest this process en route to what i hope is a long-term outcome that still is denuclearization. but i read jonathan pollack's book enough to know it's not going to be easy, and we can talk out of one side of our our mouth all they want about how denuclearization is the only legitimate goal. enemy while we're all conceding the north koreans really want these things. it seems to be what we have to do is probably break down the problem a little bit more
incrementally. remember as well, kim jong-un as a 29, 30 year-old guy who could be in power for 50 years. at least in his own mind. probably wants to be. do you really want to preside over failing state for 50 years? to gerry's earlier question, we may be getting tired of applying sanctions and doing all the stuff. imagine how the countries are getting the countries applied to them feel. north korea and iran are not in good places in terms of their economic or other development. overtime, kim jong-un will have to face a choice. if you want to go in the direction of me and mark, of vietnam, china and reform? or does he want to go running the hermit kingdom, the only remaining real stalinist state on earth for another half-century? we want to play some extent to the longer game. without letting things get worse in the short to medium-term. so i could live with the deal but did not give de facto or a nuclear steps to north koreans but at least got the first step
being one, where we start to loosen a little bit of the restriction if they stop the extent we can monitor it, if they stop expanding their arsenal. and if they stopped testing and if they stop killing south koreans. and we can maybe start to walk down a path a little more graduate. i believe in the big vision of denuclearization, but we can assert all we want to but it's not getting is very far year by year right now. >> just one other observation here. this is obviously a hypothetical you posed. the other question here, and we really haven't addressed this today, guess it's a different color for different time, but it's intimately bound up in this is whether or not the north korea that we see today in terms of this configuration, its identity, its purposes and so forth would be that same north korea in 10 years, 15 years, 20 years. i realize there's always these tendencies in the united states
to assume that this time these guys are really going down, collapse is there. they haven't obliged us. predictions of collapse in the north, not evolution but collapse, have been with us now for over 20 years. i don't know, again, for another time we could discuss that, but i think that there is generally a belief. and die to some extent share it that north korea, whatever its remarkable determination and shall i say resilience cannot our will not be able for ever to defy the laws of gravity from, economically and politically. maybe that's the calculation people are really making. i'm not trying to say everything about policy should be based upon it. but it is really a useful reminder that this is an acutely damaged society, and that if overtime there is a means by
which perhaps through increased dealings more with their south korean brethren that you see the end of this regime as we know it. that is something that i think we might be encountering over the kind of period of time that you're discussing. but we will wait and see. >> i think we need to bring this to a close. we are at our -- i apologize to all the people who still had questions, but the questions we had were very good, and so i want to thank you for that. i want to thank evans and jonathan, steve and mike for the great presentations. this is a story that will not go away, so i have high degree of confidence that we will all be back together again before too long. thank you very much for coming. [applause]
[inaudible conversations] >> [inaudible conversations] >> in a second even examining tensions on the korean peninsula, the american enterprise institute heard from former pentagon and cia officials assessing the situation. during the event panelist responded to a question about why there's never been a korea north korea. you can see this event in of events from aei anytime on our website, c-span.org.
>> it follows up on this question, i'm puzzled we haven't seen it. the first one failed, the second one failed. mouse designated successor was out in a short time. what is north korea the exception of especially because of something that nick said. it was very poor preparation. and he got rid of the military people, some of the most prominent ones. why didn't they see this coming and decided to preempt? i haven't -- whitest north korea stand out? >> we've had many dictatorships that survived numerous coups and assassination attempts. i think with the north korea we had many attempts against kim il-sung and kim jong-il that were not successful. like other dictatorships like a
donkey and saddam, they survived of them. on me, there's a very pervasive service, services and north korea. there's four of five and to keep track of each other track of each other as well as the citizens. even the most brutal dictatorship in the middle east i think really pales in comparison to north korea. the security services, there's the extremely cowed population. there's a lack of a scene in. you don't have access by foreign media so you can't have that image of the atrocity when the troops shoot on citizens which then are shined to the world and that generates pressure both in the country and outside of the country. recommendations inside the country is extremely limited, very difficult for people to plan anything, or even just as we've seen in other societies where they can use twitter, let's meet at the a